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1. The Albanian minority in Yugoslavia comprises a population of approximately 900,000 individuals living in the Kosovo, Montenegro, and Western Macedonia. The Kosovo is theoretically a part of the Autonomous Region belonging to the Republic of Serbia, which in turn is incorporated within the Yugoslav Federated Republics. By adding Metohija to Kosovo, the Autonomous Region received the name of Kosmet. The Kosmet has approximately 750,000 inhabitants, 85 per cent of whom are Albanians by origin and language.

2. At the time the borders of Albania were established by the London Conference in 1913, the Kosovo was ceded to Serbia. Numerous Kosovars and other Albanians living in the newly acquired Serbian territories sought refuge in Albania. These people settled in Fusha e Krujes, Mamurras, Fush'e Mbretit (Elbasan), Myzeqeja, and other localities. Others were expelled by the Serbians. These included a great number of notables, among whom were the Bllaca family, and numerous dignitaries of the Catholic Church. Fathers Shtjefen Kurti, Gjon Bicaku, and Mikel Shala managed to save their lives by escaping to Albania in 1929. At that time the Albanian Government sent a violent protest to the League of Nations concerning the murder of Father Shtjefen Gjocov. The murder is described in a book by Doctor Vasfi Samimi, published in Tirana in 1943.

3. The Yugoslav authorities took advantage of the ignorance of the large masses of the Albanian minority, and under the pretext that they were Turks because of their Moslem faith, denied them the right to speak their language and attempted to uproot their traditions and their patriotic or national sentiments. 50

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4. On 7 April 1939, Albania was occupied by Italy and thereafter the Albanians living within the 1913 borders of free Albania, animated by patriotism and love of freedom, fought against Italy and Germany, who had deprived them of their freedom. The wartime situation of the Albanians in Kosovo was quite different; they had been subjugated to Yugoslavia, and Italy and Germany liberated them. The profound traces of the Yugoslav yoke will remain for years to come.
5. In 1941, when Kosovo seemed to have reached the bottom of the abyss, its people were rescued and united with Albania.
5. Groups of teachers and administrative officials were sent by the Albanian Ministry of Public Education in Tirana to the Kosovo in 1941 and 1942. These "missionaries of freedom" understood the status and sentiments of the Kosovars. They managed to assuage old rancors and desires of revenge, organized administrative questions on a democratic basis, and settled the position of Serbian and Montenegrin minorities by recognizing their equality of rights with the Albanians. This means that the Slav minority was not burdened with taxes and similar hardships. From 1941 until 1944, Slavs were able to obtain positions as government officials, and enjoyed individual liberties. They were not subjected to military service. Because of their national pride, however, few Serbians and Montenegrins cared to accept any type of state function, nor did they need to since they had grown rich by exploiting their Albanian slaves. Yet many of them could have accepted jobs, since they spoke Albanian fluently.
6. Under the Albanian regime in Kosovo, the Serbs and Montenegrins enjoyed the protection of the courts against (abuses by) the Albanians, and in cases of abuse the state would intervene directly in their favor. For instance, in 1944, a soldier of the Skanderberg Division, killed a Serb in Prizren as the result of a blood feud. It was Xhafer Deva in person who ordered that the murderer be shot on the spot where the crime was committed.
7. The Communists began slowly to gain success by intrigues among the Albanian intellectuals, capturing the souls of the intelligencia with slogans about the "foreign occupation" and glittering appeals for "workers' rights". Finally, they proposed that the Albanians unite with the Communist Party in the fight for national liberation against Nazi-Fascist imperialism. Next, they sowed discord and hatred between the Albanians and their Kosovar brethren. The functionaries who arrived from free Albania were well received by the Kosovars, yet the latter did not invite the functionaries into their homes because of (family? - regional?) differences. This allowed the Serbs and the Montenegrins to offer the functionaries hospitality and courtesy and to implant in the Albanians the conviction that the Kosovars were religious fanatics. Meanwhile the Communists were disseminating their own propaganda to the effect that the functionaries were venal servants of the occupier and betrayers of workers' rights.
8. The Serb-Montenegrin minority which lived for the most part in the cities soon showed a strong inclination towards Communism. It had in fact long been their method of survival to adapt themselves to new currents and to profit by the humors of destiny. The Communists among them reaped the first harvest of their work in 1942, when they incited the Albanians to burn the city of Pec (Peja), in part destroying it. Since the Albanian authorities were anxious to placate the Slav inhabitants, the Communists were often successful in impelling them to mistreat the Kosovar population.
9. In the early days following the liberation of the Kosovo, it was the Communists who pretended to be the most fanatical missionaries of Albanian nationalism. They adopted this course with the ultimate purpose of

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subjugating the Kosovars to international Communism and Pan Slavism. Among the Communist leaders were Fadil Hoxha, Mehmet Hoxha, Xhevdet Doda, the brothers Nimani, Hysni Zajmi, Ismet Shaqir, and others.

10. In the winter of 1943 there were large-scale massacres of Kosovars in Rozaj. Five hundred men were killed by knives and machine gun fire in attacks first by the Chetniks, and later by the Partisans. Despite calamities such as this, the Kosovars remained staunch and loyal to their alliance with the House of Savoy. They enlisted in the National Army of the Albanian Government, and organized themselves in battles with the Partisans and Chetniks. They fought off Partisan and Chetnik attacks at Play, Gusinje, Rozaj, Tutinit, Kosovska Mitrovica, Raska and Kursumlija, on mountain heights of the Gnjilane area, along the Morava River, and in all localities where Albanian was spoken. They affirmed their right of independence by reconstituting in 1942 the Second League of Prizren, headed by Bedri Pejani. With this League they revived the traditions of the First League. All Albanians responded to the League's appeal, ready to defend the borders of the mother country. They defended these borders until the arrival of the Soviet Army in Serbia.
11. The Kosovars defended their homes, religion, traditions and freedom with the assistance of the Albanian National Army. In this they were greatly encouraged by the Germans, although there were no regular Axis troops in the Kosovo. The reason for this is that the Kosovars felt that the struggle against the Communist Slavs was their own problem. Also, after Germany reached an agreement with Italy on 14 September 1943, she was no longer interested in routing Serb Partisans in Yugoslavia. Because the Kosovars had decided that the struggle with the Communists was their own problem, their forces were only flanked by Albanian troops. Two companies belonging to the Balli Kombetar organization arrived on the Lim River in June 1944, led by Jup Kazazi, Sulejman Lleshi, who later fell in battle; Halim Begeja; and Professor Saraqi. These men were a symbol of encouragement to the Kosovars, although they were compelled after a short period of time to return to Albania.
12. The courage of the Kosovars was firm in defending the borders of the Kosovo, but events proved stronger than their valor for the power of the Axis was gradually waning. However, a principal preoccupation of the Kosovars was the internal situation in Albania. The Yugoslavs had managed to infiltrate the ranks of the leaders of the Albanian political parties and to sow confusion. This state of affairs lasted until the time of the Mukaj Conference. The Albanian Communists did not as yet dare to come in front of the Albanian people in the company of Serbian leaders. They knew that a showdown would be inevitable in such an event, especially on the question of the Kosovo. Consequently the chief of the Albanian Communists, Sales Boshnjaku, who was actually the ill-famed Dusan Mugosa, ordered that Enver Hoxha, Mustafa Gjinishi, Omer Nishani, and others of their kind, be proclaimed national liberators.
13. The apprehensions of Albanian patriots were great because of the disintegration of the Axis, the opening up of a second front by the Allies, and the fact that the Communists were recipients of greater Allied aid than the anti-Fascists (sic). The Communists outwitted the Albanian nationalists by a demand that discussion of the Kosovo question be postponed until it could be settled at a later date by a plebiscite. The Kosovars were, so to speak, caught in a web prepared by those two masters of intrigue,

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Dusan Mugosa and Miladin Popovic. It was impossible to fight the Albanian Communists headed by Enver Hoxha, and at the same time to resist the Montenegrins, Serbians, Chetniks and Bulgarians. Despite their adverse fate, the Kosovars did all in their power to save their independence. From 1941 until 1944 they stood firm as a stone wall, defending their borders. They maintained public order in their region, and were an important factor in quelling the troubles provoked by Communists in Albania proper.

14. The Albanian Communist Partisans were not strong enough to disturb the public order, since they numbered only between 15 and 30 armed groups. Their only accomplishments were to stop three vehicles, which were carrying civilians, and in killing Father Lorenzo Mitrovici and a soldier in Rastovic (Djakova), as well as in knocking down five telephone poles. Very few Kosovars gave support to the Communist Party. That Gani Bey Kryeziu, a member of one of the oldest, most noble, and most influential families in Djakovo as well as in Kosovo as a whole gave moral support to [redacted] is an admitted fact, but that he gave it material support is not proven.
- [redacted]

15. The Slavs used the same tactics in Albania. Dusan Mugosa and Miladin Popovic ran the Partisan movement in Albania, but were never overtly at the head of it. They presented themselves to the Albanians as collaborators in the anti-Fascist and nationalist cause. They used the same tactics in taking advantage of Abas Kupa and his supporters in Albania, and Gani Bey in Yugoslavia. Pressure was exerted through emissaries: Fadil Hoxha, the Brothers Niman, Ali Shyqri, et cetera. 50X1-HUM
16. What were the forces which these Partisan brigands had at their disposal in the Kosovo? [redacted] In October 1944, when Shefqet Peci, commander of the Third Albanian Communist Division, met Fadil Hoxha, commander of the forces of national liberation of Kosovo-Metohija, the latter had only 80 followers, of whom 20 belonged to Gani Bey Kryeziu, who had just broken with the Communists because of their assassination of his adviser, Lazar Fundo. In consequence, Kryeziu was forced to remain in hiding for a short time. On 5 January 1945, he was arrested and his 30 followers shot. The "national liberators" gathered signatures affirming their contention that Kryeziu was a bourgeois traitor and had sold himself to Karadjordjevic. He was condemned to five years of prison without trial; later he was assassinated. 50X1-HUM
17. The population of Kosovo did not intentionally commit suicide, but ambitious leaders led it to ruin. It responded with enthusiasm to the call to enlist in the Albanian national army; it fought wherever necessary, exposing itself to the attacks of the Partisans and the Chetniks who attacked its borders.
18. Meanwhile, the intellectuals and the ideologists pursued their spurious theories under the influence of the preconceptions of Red propaganda.

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If, in 1944, energetic measures were taken by the Germans and by the government in Kosovo and Metohija against the Serbo-Montenegrin and the few Albanian Communists, the people realized that these were for their own welfare and did not withdraw their loyalty from the government for one moment. The judgment of the Kosovar people was: "They have done well even though there were Albanians among the guilty."

19. With the crumbling of the Axis, the Partisans in Albania were able to lift up their heads and openly enter the political scene. For Kosovo, the days following the withdrawal of the Albanian Government were decisive. In December 1944, the Albanian Brigades occupied Prizren, Djakovo, Juniku, Decani, Peja, and penetrated deep into the heart of Kosovo. Kosovo was defeated by the Serbian mind, but its instrument was the Albanian Partisans.
20. The Kosovars are full of hatred against Enver Hoxha. It would be well to remember this fact, and to take advantage of it at the decisive moment of the future conflict. Under the Yugoslav occupation, the Albanians made superhuman sacrifices to protect their liberty, both individual and national. They spent their blood freely in the fight against the Communists and the Slavs, since it was always the ideal of their country which inspired them. The Kosovars, even though they understood that the Italians and Germans were invaders, nevertheless thank and remember them with sympathy, since it was after all they who gave them freedom to defend themselves against the Slav Communists. This people remains faithful to its national cause, and puts its life at the disposition of any civilized and peace-loving power which will allow it to fight Pan Slavism masking itself as Communism.

Social Situation under Albania

21. From 1941 when the Kosovo was united to Albania, until 1944 when Slav Communists seized power, Serbian and Montenegrin subjects were treated in like manner as the Kosovar Albanians, that is to say, with perfect equality. Discomfort was suffered only by those individuals who were against the regime, and dealt in political intrigue. There was complete freedom of religious worship. Public order was exemplary. Albanians, Serbians, and Montenegrins alike could travel undisturbed to cities in Albania proper; there merchants would go to sell their wares and purchase manufactured goods to take back. No one went hungry because there was an abundance of food in the country as well as in the cities. Stores were always well stocked with various merchandise, and new shops were being opened to the public. The cost of living did increase during the war years, but this was largely because the Albanian Government had abandoned the gold standard.
22. After thirty years of slavery, the groups of teachers and voluntary missionaries who were sent to the Kosovo by the Albanian Government were the first to address the Kosovars in the Albanian language. In connection with this, Albanian schools were organized in Kosovska Mitrovica, secondary schools and a gymnasium were opened in Prizren, a normal school at Djakovica, and a secondary and an advanced normal school with dormitories for 500 students were established at Pristina. The newly established elementary schools in villages were staffed with Albanian teachers. Whereas in a short period of time the cadre of teachers greatly increased in the Kosovo, it diminished in Albania itself, since the government of

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Zog had never visualized the necessity of an extensive teaching cadre. During this time a thorough study was made of Serbian administrative laws so that they could be synchronized with the Albanian laws. A whole administrative system was created which included courts, the armed forces and police in villages, sports organizations, summer camps for the young, et cetera. In addition, fifteen scholarships were established for students who desired to further their studies at a foreign university. The purpose was to educate for the future a certain number of specialists who would be familiar with the spirit of [] culture.

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23. Through the tenacity of the Government in developing public education between 1941 and 1944, the spirit of nationalism was upheld in the souls of the Kosovars, in its teachers, officials, and students in particular. The inspectorates and directorates of public education and schools of the secondary level, were well provided with libraries stocked with Albanian reading matter on intellectual subjects of all kinds. More Albanian language books were published in the Kosovo than were published in Albania during her independence. Neither was the lack of books felt in elementary schools or among Government officials. The Serbians and Montenegrins complained that the Government had not established a larger number of Serb elementary schools. The reason for this is however, that the Slavs had never formally requested that this be done.

Political Situation from 1944 until the Tito-Hoxha Rift

24. All volunteer nationalist forces opposing Communism gathered in mountain hideouts under the leadership of Ymer Berisha, Mulla Idriz, and Lluan Gashi. In 1944, the nationalist volunteers of the Kosovo were defeated by the 3, 5, 7, and 17 Brigades of the Albanian Army under the command of Shefqet Peci, a native of Mallakastra. All the cities of the Kosovo were occupied by these brigades which were guided or led by independent groups of Kosovar Partisans. The entire population of the occupied region was automatically conscripted, by a Partisan military order, into the "Army of National Liberation". Only one fifth of the able-bodied men, the nationalist volunteers of the Kosovo who remained in the mountains, escaped mobilization.
25. As German forces withdrew, the Albanian 5, 7, and 17 Brigades pursued them to the Banat, encountering epidemics such as typhus, and consequently death. Only one fourth of these forces returned. In the meantime, Shaban Palluzha of Drenica received orders to form a new Kosovar brigade which would join the Albanian brigades in pursuit of the Germans. Numerous nationalists were to be found among the men recruited by Palluzha. Aware of this fact, Professor Ymer Berisha, of Drenica, dispatched his men to the spot to persuade the nationalists to stay at home. This took place on 16 January 1945. When the revolt had sufficiently matured, Berisha appeared among the revolvers and gave a fiery patriotic speech against joining the Albanian Brigades. He stressed that the Kosovo was being ~~cravenly~~ abandoned to the Serbians and Montenegrins, adding that the Slavs were getting rid of the Albanians by sending them after the Germans. As a result, all joined Berisha against the Serbians.
26. The battle in favor of the Communists initiated under Shaban Palluzha against the Kosovo evolved into an illustrious national epic. The insurrection of the nationalists was set off in Drenica and Llapja, the

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inhabitants of which were loyal to the nationalist spirit of Xhafer Deva. Following this, militants from all parts of the country joined in the insurrection. Heroic battles of the Albanian race against the Slavs were once again repeated on the rough mountain peaks and glaciers. Some six hundred Kosovars fell in battle, but the Slavs paid with 2,500 dead. The three major battles fought were at Drenica, Gnjilane, and Ferizaj.

27. The nationalists put up a fierce fight at Drenica. Endless lines of carts crowded the roads through Kosovo transporting ammunition and food to the men by day, and returning with the wounded and sick at night, bound for hospitals at Pristina, Mitrovica, and Pec. The joint command of the 7 Brigade was aware that the Kosovars were determined to fight to the end, so it invited Mufti Asim Luzha, former representative of Drenica to meet with it for the purpose of alleged negotiations. The safe conduct clause, however, was violated, and the Mufti was shot on the spot. After this insidious murder, the fighting in the mountains grew to be more furious and determined, and it was there that Shaban Lluzha died in combat.
28. The Gnjilane region rose in revolt under the leadership of Mulla Idriz, remembered in folk songs as "Muderris". Idriz encouraged his men by citing verses by Pasha Vaso Shkodrani, such as "The Religion of the Albanian is Albania". In the spring of 1945 nationalist forces attacked and won the town of Ferizaj. Unfortunately, the victory was short-lived for lack of ammunition, a weakening of discipline, and lack of strategic planning. Moreover, as additional Communist forces were freed by the German withdrawal, they swooped down upon the town from all sides. A fierce battle raged, but here too, nationalist forces were overpowered. The damage inflicted upon the city testifies to the tenacity of the resistance. Approximately one thousand of the enemy died in battle, whereas there were barely 200 dead among nationalist forces in the battles of Gnjilane and Ferizaj. When the Communists resorted to massacres of the population in reprisal for their losses, the nationalists were obliged, reluctantly, to give up the struggle.
29. Unlike the other peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia who are subjected to sufferings brought on by Communism, the Kosovars are the victims in addition of Serbian chauvinism. As long as relations between Marshal Tito and Enver Hoxha remained on a friendly plane, the Kosovars were not well treated by the Albanian Communists. Thus the Kosovars who fought the Slavs or fled to the mountains because of Serbian oppression, were so to speak, caught between hammer and anvil. Communism as applied in the Kosovo, has nothing to do with Marxist doctrines. It is merely a product of hatred which the Serbians and Montenegrins have for the Albanians. Here Communism is aimed at breaking down the energy of the Kosovars in order that they may be extinguished, and their property taken over by the so-called liberators.
30. In Communist Albania, Koci Xoxe, a Serbophile, was in charge of foreign relations with Yugoslavia. However, the servility which he and his assistants demonstrated in the arrests and tortures of Kosovar nationalists stunned even the Yugoslavs in whose favor this was being done. Ram Bllaca, former minister; Professor Selman Riza, leader of the Irredentist Party and former mayor of Pec; Muharrem Mitrovica; Captain Gjon Destanishta; and numerous other civilians and military men were arrested in Tirana and turned over to the Yugoslav Government, where they were tried and sentenced to various terms at hard labor. Others were sentenced to death.

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31. Dusan Mugosa and his close collaborator Miladin Popovic are the two men largely responsible for the Communist defeat of Kosovar Albanians. The return of the Yugoslavs to the Kosovo and the policies which they represented encountered a terse but pithy response. On 14 March 1945, Haki Taha, a teacher, assassinated Popovic in Pristina. As a result Taha was arrested, shot, and dragged through the streets, with a sign ironically pinned to his chest bearing the words "Death to the traitors! Freedom to the Albanians!" The Slav Communists took revenge for the death of Popovic by shooting 1,600 Kosovar members of Communist brigades stationed at Bar, Montenegro.

Another proof of the massacre of these men is the fact that no dead are registered in Bar on the official Communist lists for 17 and 18 March.

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32. From October 1944 on, the Communists maintained a fairly accurate register of the names of those persons in the Kosovo and Metohija regions on whom major penalties including death sentences were imposed. Names of Albanian martyrs who were hanged or shot can be found listed in registers of the so-called People's Courts. Such death sentences were actually dictated by the Communist Party and the text passed on by the UDB, and merely pronounced by the Court during the brief appearances before the judges of the defendants, in order to create the impression of a fair democratic trial. During the dark and cold nights of 1944, 1945 and 1946 prisoners sentenced to death were taken out of their cells, packed into trucks and dispatched to deserted localities such as Germis, Karakaci, Llukaci, Moglice, Gjafe, and Kalas, or to the hills of Ibrit, Svecanit, and Gjilane, where they were ordered to dig their own graves. After the execution the graves were hurriedly covered with a little earth or snow. When the snow melted, the decomposed corpses were laid bare.
33. When such horrible deeds can be committed in a country, it is futile to speak of freedoms. Events as they occurred, speak for themselves. For example, when general elections were being prepared, supposedly to represent a free expression of the people of Kosovo, Slav authorities organized a meeting in Prizren, by invitation only, in the early part of May 1945, and delegates were selected exclusively from among the "national liberators". It was at this meeting that the newly organized Albanian Committee for the Kosovo and Metohija and the organization of the People's Front put forth a resolution stating that "the Albanian people, by their own free will, express the desire to remain within the borders of Yugoslavia." When people inquired of the political commissars during the elections why there were no Albanian ballot boxes, these officials would reply "Wherefore? All the world knows that Enver Hoxha, Tito and Stalin are one and the same. There will no longer be borders between us and Albania. We have become brothers by the blood we have spilled together. Nothing will ever again separate us!"
34. An insight into the critical situation created in 1944, when the Communists seized power in the Kosovo, can be obtained from statements made by members of secret nationalist organizations following their arrest. The group of Halim Spahiu, former chief of the municipal board of Prizren, was arrested in July 1945. One of the members of this group had on him a list of 72 names. After an inquiry lasting approximately one year,

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six of the 72 men in question were shot, among them Halim Spahiu, Tahir Deda, and Rexhep Kabashi. Eight other persons whose names were also listed were sentenced to various terms of punishment. A group of teachers headed by the veterinary, Dr. Sylejman Lleshi of Tirana, was arrested in Djakovica. Twelve men of this group were sentenced to various terms of punishment.

35. On 11 August 1946, the prisoners of the Pec penitentiary attempted an escape. Unfortunately they were caught, and upon this occasion, Dr. Sylejman Lleshi, Skender Curri, Mirteza Kryeziu, and Bajram Shllaku, all members of a nationalist organization, plus ten other prisoners, lost their lives. Members of the nationalist organization of Pristina, among them Gjon Sereqi of Ferizaj and Sylejman Aliu of Prizren, were arrested in the spring of 1945. This group had assisted Lluan Gashi and his companions. Members of another nationalist organization, headed by Father Bernadin Llupi, clergyman of Pec, were arrested in the summer of 1946. Father Llupi had maintained contact with Professor Ymer Berisha, chief of the nationalist forces operating in Yugoslavia with Ndue Perlleshi acting as liaison agent. Other members of Father Llupi's group included Marija Shllaku and the teacher Gjergj Martini, both from the Shkoder area, who were later killed in an encounter with the Partisans. They were liaison agents between the nationalists of Shkoder and those of Djakovica, Prizren, and Pristina.
36. All the secret organizations and their subordinate local branches endeavored between 1945 and 1947 to maintain contact with the political leaders hiding in the Kosovo. In this manner the organization of Halim Spahiu maintained contact with Ymer Berisha and Muharrem Bajraktari, while the organization of Sylejman Lleshi was in contact with Ymer Berisha and Jup Binjaku. Binjaku on the other hand endeavored to establish contact and coordinate his actions with those of Dem Ali Pozhani. The organization of Father Bernardin Llupi had contacts with Ymer Berisha, Ndue Perlleshi, Pashuk Biba, and Ndoc Mirakaj. The Pristina organization was linked with Ymer Berisha, Lluan Gashi, Gjon Sereqi, and Abdyl Hensin. The organizations of Gnjilane maintained contact with Mulla Idriz. Liaison agent for the organizations of Vitina, Kamenica, and Presevo was Sul Hoti.
37. To the nationalists who were awaiting assistance from abroad, no help was forthcoming. In the meantime OZNA was growing more powerful from day to day. On 6 August 1946, a meeting was held between representatives of the nationalist refugees and Ymer Berisha, leader of the Kosovar resistance groups, who presided at the meeting. The nationalist refugee delegates were Pashul Bib Mirakaj, Ndoc Kol Mirakaj, and Nik Sokolli, who were entrusted with the task of establishing efficient collaboration with the Berisha group. Unfortunately OZNA agents found out about the meeting. In the affray which followed, Professor Berisha, the spirit, strength and brain of the resistance, lost his life. Still other leaders fell in Albania, including Jup Kazazi and Mark Gjonmarkaj.
38. It was evident at the trial of the secret nationalist organization of Skoplje, held in 1946, that the Albanians of Macedonia were animated by the same spirit as that of the Kosovars. The nationalist organization of Skoplje was headed by Azem Morava and Captain Hysni Rudi. Nobody in the Kosovo was sentenced for having been a member of the Albanian Monarchist Party since they were all considered as members of Xhafer Deva's organization. In his reports to the Communist Party, Dusan Mugosa described the Kosovars as members of the Balli Kombetar, and they were considered as such at the Serbian Communist trials. Dusan Mugosa derived his conclusion

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from the fact that there were actually groups of Kosovars among the followers of Xhafer Deva in Albania who called themselves Ballists. In Albania, Deva had political contacts with Mehdi Frasheri, Ali Klissura, Abaz Ermeni, and Vasil Andoni. This is why prior to 1948 these four men and their followers were considered by the Yugoslavs to be inspired with the same political principles as the Balli Kombetar.

39. Immediately after the Communists seized power in the Kosovo, they launched an active propaganda campaign, distributing leaflets throughout the region and organizing indoctrination courses which everybody was compelled to attend. Those who were absent without justification were accused of sabotage, arrested, beaten, and then paraded through the streets under the supervision of OZNA officials. The populace was obliged to demonstrate by following them, and anyone who did not interrupt his work to follow the demonstration was also beaten and taken along with the prisoner to share his fate. The OZNA, later known as the UDB, was particularly active in 1946. Numerous persons were assassinated or simply disappeared. On the other hand, the Albanians likewise were quite active in that year in the creation of secret nationalist organizations. No specific law existed providing for the punishment of individuals dissatisfied with the newly created situation, and OZNA was therefore obliged to frame them as political criminals. If this was not possible, individuals considered to be undesirable were accused of belonging to some political group and sentenced by the local People's Court to from six months to one year of heavy labor. Presidents of these courts were confidential agents especially appointed for this purpose.
40. The situation of the Kosovars had never been dangerous and as serious as it was between 1944 and 1948, when their only alternatives were prison, suicide, or humble acceptance of the Communist and Slav yoke. During this time there were at least three times as many Albanians as there were Slavs in penitentiaries of the Republic of Serbia. Every town had two or three OZNA sections, and each section had its own prison, guarded by the Army. Even the militia had its own prisons. The prisons of the Kosovo, where there were never less than six thousand prisoners, were crowded with Albanians. The largest penitentiary in the Kosovo Region, where there were never less than a thousand prisoners, is located in Pristina. Currently the construction of a prison with a capacity for two thousand prisoners is under way in this city. The largest penitentiary within the Republic of Serbia is in Nis. It contains approximately five thousand prisoners, four thousand of whom are Albanians. Here, where the soul of the prisoner is shaped by tortures to the body, the most refined methods are applied to break the patriotism of the Kosovars through "re-education". The prison has two departments, one known as "Hell", and the other as "Purgatory". The latter contained four thousand convicts in 1946 to 1948, 2,500 of whom were Albanians. In the prisons of Mitrovica, Pozarevac, and Kragujevac, four-fifths of the convicts were Albanians. One-half of the inmates in the Idrizov penitentiary of Skoplje are Albanians from Macedonia who are mistreated by the guards in the same manner as the Kosovars.

Economic Situation up to 1948

41. In line with Communist economy, the Partisans began in 1944 with the establishment of collective farming or cooperatives. This contributed greatly toward the impoverishment of the population. The peasant who

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formerly had enough to live on eventually became quite poor, and consequently lost interest in his work or labor. He became indifferent to whether the crop was good or poor, since the State took all but the prescribed minimum for his own needs. Agricultural products and cattle were merely taken away from peasants by members of the local board of the Communist Party. Families with enough bread even on holidays were rare, for the State took away wheat from the Albanian peasant, and gave only a little corn in return. In addition to this, there were "voluntary" loans contributed to by the peasants, and organized by regional committees of the Party. In this regard a campaign would be launched, and the citizens called upon to compete in offering to the State the surplus of their crop in the form of grain, wool, meat, honey, or similar products. Collectors would then proceed from house to house seizing the property of undesirable persons such as those who were not Party members, those who did not support propaganda in favor of the People's Front, youth activities, or persons who had relatives in prison. Under such circumstances, how could one expect the peasant to work with zeal. He was obliged to sell all he had at home, and all the yields of his crop, or go to prison. This is the reason that there are so many Albanians in the penitentiaries of Gnjilane, Ferizaj, and Nis.

42. When the Government had sequestered its share of the foodstuffs and crops of the peasants, it would issue a proclamation that they were free to sell their products on the open market. Only then could one note a handful of peasants coming to town to sell a few meager items and to purchase others. Usually the first day at the market would pass calmly. On the second or third day, however, the militia would appear, take the name of the sellers, and seize their goods on the grounds that they lacked permits to sell the merchandise in question.
43. A large number of young people from the Kosovo were compelled to work on construction projects such as canals, roads, and railroads, or on the reconstruction of Belgrade. Whatever construction projects were carried out in the Kosovo were not for the benefit of the Kosovars. New buildings erected were meant to quarter Serbian and Montenegrin officials. Likewise, in the interests of the Slav colonists, new homes were built, lands made fit for cultivation, factories constructed, roads laid down, and forests exploited; but the manpower for such work was provided by the Albanians. Albanians had to be satisfied with hard labor and a morsel of dry bread. Serbians and Montenegrins on the other hand were not to be seen at this type of work since more lofty jobs were reserved for them in government offices, within the militia, or in other supervisory capacities.
44. Albanians have preferred to work in the mines rather than in the fields in order to escape the taxes imposed upon agricultural workers. Consequently thousands of Albanian miners are to be found in Trepce, Zemunica, Golesi, Deva near Djakovica, and elsewhere. The unfortunate workers who are victims of accidents and cannot continue work are decorated with beautiful medals, and their names cited in the papers. These are the substitutes for invalid pensions.

Cultural and Social Situation up to 1948

45. From the Communists seizure of power to the break with the Cominform, the promise of Albanian language teaching in the Kosmet was maintained, although the Slavs looked with displeasure upon the opening of Albanian schools. In the beginning, on the basis of the promises given, the

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official language was Albanian, but this concession suffered various obstructions in March and April 1945. Thus for example, the Serbs pretended that Albanians lacked technical terms corresponding to those in Serb, especially in the field of administration. They also averred that the creation of special schools would be necessary, if the Albanian language were to be used, and this involved a great loss of time and great expense. As a result, the Serbs tried to persuade the Albanians that the existence of Albanian alongside Serbian was futile, since the Kosovars understood the latter. Gradually, the Serbian language replaced Albanian both in civilian and military offices, although some traces of the Albanian language could still be found in public offices until the latter part of 1945. The schools continued to maintain correspondence in the Albanian language with the educational centers to which they were subordinate, but even this procedure went out of practice when necessity demanded a greater speed and efficiency in dealing with Communist officials. Translating into Serbian took time and rendered the work more laborious.

46. The question on the official use of the Albanian language in the Kosovo, as authorized by law, was frequently discussed. After 1948 it became an issue when the propaganda campaign conducted by the Albanian Government over the press and radio on this matter became extremely fierce. As a result, the problem was again re-examined. In the meantime, the population was granted permission to address requests and petitions to the municipal councils in the Albanian language. However, since the members and secretaries of these councils were Serbians, they could always claim not to know Albanian, which invariably caused a delay and even complete failure to act on the petitions. Thus, despite the statute authorizing the use of Albanian, Serbian remained the administrative language.
47. Teachers on the staff originally sent by the Ministry of Public Education in Tirana to the Kosovo in 1941 and 1942 were gradually released by the end of 1945, with the exception of three or four individuals who successfully ingratiated themselves with the authorities. The majority of the teachers were accused of membership in a secret nationalist organization. Among those sentenced to death were Bedri Gjina, professor at the normal school and director of the elementary school of Djakovica; Dr. Sylejman Lleshi, professor of the normal school of Djakovica; and Skender Curri and Myrteza Kryeziu, both of whom were teachers in Djakovica. Professor Gjon Sereqi, native of Ferizaj, escaped to the mountains but was later caught by OZNA. Professor Kil Margjini was sentenced for having been vice-president of the Second League of Prizren; he died in Pozarevac. Students who had attended courses in pedagogy were accused of collaboration with the above professors, and sentenced to various terms of punishment in 1945. Albanian instructors in Western Macedonia received similar treatment.
48. The elimination of nationalist professors in the Kosovo in 1945 was done in full accord with Enver Hoxha. New educational personnel was dispatched from Albania, hastily recruited from among semi-ignorant students who had no special training in pedagogy. They were sent in two groups, one in 1945 and the other in 1947, and numbered some forty to fifty persons. Other prospective teachers were recruited locally, and training courses organized for them. In order to create the impression that new educational cadres were being formed, numerous courses were given. Although schools which were established between 1941 and 1944 were maintained, new schools were eventually opened both on the elementary and secondary levels. New secondary schools included a high school in Pristina and a school for pedagogy in Djakovica. Other types of schools included agricultural, technical, and mechanical schools, as well as trade schools and music schools, but the language employed in all these schools was Serbian.

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49. The history of the Yugoslav national struggle for liberation, the structure of the Communist Party, and biographies of Communist leaders were taught in Albanian as well as in Serbian schools. Since text books on these subjects were not available in the Albanian language, teachers were obliged to translate the material and explain it to their pupils in Albanian. Most teachers in Albanian schools did not have a fluent command of Serbian, and this fact slowed down the educational progress considerably. As was the case before the war, Albanian history was still not taught in the schools. Any student who knew any facts of Albanian history had learned them through his own patriotic initiative. The Serbs dared even to dispute the origin of Skanderbeg. Whenever the story of Skanderbeg came up for discussion, Party officials would declare that the problem had not as yet been solved. Its solution was finally entrusted to Dusan Mugosa.
50. Albanian textbooks for reading and arithmetic were published in 1946 and 1947, and were used in the first, second, and third grades of elementary schools. The speller was published at the same time. The reader and geography book for the fourth grade of elementary schools were likewise published in 1947. The science book for the first grade of high school was published in 1947. With the exception of the speller, all the above publications had been translated from Serbian.
51. Boarding schools were established in Prizren, Djakovica, Pec, Pristina, Kosovska Mitrovica, and Gnjilane in 1946. The food was not sufficient to meet the needs of growing youngsters who were expending energy in their studies. Thus in 1947 the daily ration of bread comprised a mere 350 grams. In 1948 the daily bread ration was increased to 500 grams. However, in the spring of the same year the pupils were sent out to work on construction projects. The work was planned by the Party, and "volunteers" were chosen from lists compiled for that purpose by youth organizations. Names of the "volunteers" selected were gloriously heralded in newspapers in order to make the young folk proud of their achievements, although the work done by them was sheer loss of time, since the basic and hard work on these projects had previously been done by political convicts from the various republics of Yugoslavia.
52. When a group of Albanians desired to present a play in their own language, all types of excuses were fabricated to prevent them from renting a theater for this purpose. In response to requests, the Party would state that the principle and desire were legitimate, but that various difficulties were involved such as lack of Albanian costumes, lack of appropriate furniture, decorations, scenarios, et cetera. These replies were as often as not delayed. In addition, rumors would circulate that the subject of the play was not suitable because it was not in accordance with Communist ideology.
53. Albanians do not frequent libraries very much, nor do Serbians and Montenegrins for that matter. Although there are only a very few books in Albanian, the libraries abound in material containing speeches and biographies of the Yugoslav Communist leaders. The library of the Inspectorate for Public Education in Prizren, and the libraries of the secondary schools had been well stocked with Albanian books between 1941 and 1944, which were partly collected, and partly donated by the Ministry for Public Education in Tirana. These libraries were later looted by the Partisans, who donated some of the books to the Party libraries, and

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destroyed the others. Party libraries now keep some of these books as a reference on the facts and thoughts of the Albanian past, so that they may eventually be utilized in the future as misconstrued and slanderous propaganda.

Present Political Situation

54. The Yugoslavs soon perceived the nature underlying Soviet tactics, and realized that Cominform ideologies were merely a cover for the ambitious Panslav projects of the Czars, implemented by Stalin. Soviet plans were partially realized in Albania by Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu. Koci Xoxe, a pro-Serb Communist was sentenced to death, and Albania gave an outward indication of repenting for her submissive policies toward Yugoslavia. Albania likewise attempted to manifest great concern and pity for the Kosovo which she had occupied in 1944 and 1945, and which she abandoned to the mercy of the Slavs in 1946. But the Albanian population did not submit so easily to the Communists, and this particularly pertains to those living in mountainous regions. Thousands of people were massacred and imprisoned. Others successfully escaped to 50X1-HUM
55. Albanians living in the Kosovo, in Western Macedonia, and Montenegro fortunately have had no illusions regarding the Yugoslav brand of Communism. The Communists during their four years of power were not successful in their attempts to convert them, whereas in Albania the people have often been duped by the Yugoslavs. When Yugoslav-Albanian relations were severed, the Yugoslavs incited the people of the Kosovo against Albania in order to create discord between them. It would be foolish to believe in the sincerity of the Yugoslav Government in its endeavors and resort to all possible means to incite the Albanians against the government of Enver Hoxha, since the Yugoslav Communists themselves brought Hoxha and his group to power, and were responsible for the loss of the Kosovo through the help of Albanian Communists. The Kosovars will fight in the future as they have in the past for reunion with their mother country, but the conditions will be that a future Albania guarantee the democratic freedom of its subjects, and that she remain within the orbit of the Free Nations.
56. From 1948 onwards those Kosovar nationalists who were suspected of plotting the reunion of their region with Albania, were considered or sentenced as Cominform supporters. Such was the case, for example, of Rifat Berisha of Drenica, who at an opportune political moment succeeded in becoming president of the People's Front of Kosmet. Accused of being a Cominformist he consequently fled to the mountains. He was later surrounded on Istok Mountain and perished in the encounter. There is no doubt but that he worked for the nationalist cause. After his death three groups of individuals were arrested in Drenica under the accusation of belonging to a secret nationalist organization directed by reactionaries whose leader was Berisha. Twelve young men who were members of this organization are today awaiting their trials in Pristina.
57. Koci Xoxe followers are furthering pro-Tito propaganda in Albania. Groups of such men are sent into Albanian territory from Yugoslav frontier posts and entrenchments. They maintain contacts with Albanian citizens, direct propaganda activities and assist dissatisfied Albanians to escape from their country. Often officials and workers of both sexes are kidnaped and brought into Yugoslavia where they are interrogated by the UDB and

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released at a later date with the excuse of mistaken identity. Since 1948 all Albanian Communists seeking refuge from Enver Hoxha's dictatorship have been welcomed in Yugoslavia. Much propaganda was likewise disseminated during 1948 by Yugoslav authorities to persuade Albanian nationalists to come to Yugoslavia. Unfortunately some such persons who did escape during this time have not been heard of since. One such case is that of the nationalist Marku Bib Vokrrri and his fifty men. It was only in the latter part of 1949 that Albanian refugees were received in the capacity of emigres. Some among them were even armed by the Yugoslavs and sent back to Albania to fight in the resistance against Hoxha. Albanian officers have been particularly well received of late and met at the border by Montenegrin officers. Many of the officer refugees currently occupy important positions, and 70 per cent of them in the Kosovo are to be found either in the Army or in the UDB.

58. Despite the precautions undertaken by the Yugoslavs against border infiltrations, Hoxha's armed groups have succeeded in penetrating Yugoslavia. One of these groups under the leadership of Shaban Braha of Luma, encountered UDB troops near Prizren in September 1951, and all of the members of the group were killed. The Kosovars have been rendered desperate through the policies of repression adopted by the Yugoslav Government, but they have not, regardless, abandoned their national aspirations. Those among them who live in the vicinity of the border zone are exhausted from the nocturnal visits of the armed forces and from the noise of artillery pieces and machine gun fire both day and night on either side of the border.
59. After 1948 there were numerous Kosovar townsmen and peasants living in Albania who wished to return to the Kosovo. Those who returned were imprisoned and tortured. One such case was that of Ndue Preng Bajraktari of Prizren who returned with six companions, confident in his belief that Yugoslavia had become a democratic nation. They all were arrested and sentenced to six years imprisonment on charges of having collaborated with the Italians between 1941 and 1943.
60. After the Yugoslav-Albanian break, Yugoslav authorities successfully persuaded Albanian officials who had come from Albania to remain in the Kosovo by promises of monetary remuneration in return for signing a declaration against the Albanian Government. When the declaration was signed, their names were published in the newspapers and broadcast over the radio, which severed any possibilities they may have had of returning to their own country. The promises, however, were forgotten. Those among the officials who asked for the promised remuneration were threatened, and accused of misleading the Kosovars, as well as attempting to unite Kosovo to Albania. They were then either imprisoned or transferred to other localities where they were kept under surveillance. Such cases include Professor Serafin Mazreku, a man of seventy who with numerous sons had come from Shkoder; Muharrem Ymeraj of Tepelena; and Hysni Selmani and his family. Not only had these men never had anything to do with the Hoxha authorities, but they were indignant at the mere mention of Hoxha's name or Communist ideology.
61. Between 1945 and 1947, well-known organizers of the nationalist movement within their districts disappeared, including Ymer Berisha, Gjon Sereqi, and Captain Rudi. These men set examples of great patriotism working either individually or as group leaders. There were some among the nationalists who did not escape not because of the lack of 50X1-HUM

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opportunity, but because they chose to remain. Such is the case of Ibrahim Lufti, secretary of Reis el Ulema the Grand Mufti of Sarajevo, who later became prefect of Kosovo. Lufti shot himself rather than to be taken alive by the Serb Communists. Sula Hoti will likewise be remembered as the leader of Albanian volunteers who fought in the epic battle against Partisan brigades near the village Lisocke of Kamenica in December 1944. Mulla Idriz (Muderiz) of Gnjilane another hero, fought against a group of 600 Bulgarians in Gnjilane, who was betrayed and tortured to death. Ndue Perllishi and Ndoc Mirakaj, heroically gave their lives in an encounter with Albanian Communists.

62. Sali Rushit and Sahit Shabani, teachers and revolutionary nationalists from the vicinity of Gnjilane murdered two UDB officers in Viline in July 1950, and then fled to the mountains. After a year of guerrilla activities, both men and their families were killed near Prizren on 24 August 1951. The Vocoli brothers from Vucitrn have become famous in the nationalist movement during the past few years, giving moral support to men of their district, and performing patriotic actions against those who have joined the enemy since 1947. The group organized by Sali Lisi of Kercova, Macedonia, likewise met with heroic deaths.
63. During the construction of the Brcko-Banovic road, a secret organization known as the "Young Moslems" was created, composed mainly of young people from Bosnia and Hercegovina, but also including a number of young Albanian members. The aim of the organization was to unite all Yugoslav Moslems in their fight against Titoism and Communism. Since the organization was uncovered in Pec, it was disguised at the trials as an Albanian organization. The Bosnians who were tried were given light sentences or set free, whereas Albanians were either accorded death sentences or a minimum of ten years at hard labor.
64. The Germans created much ill-feeling during the period of occupation because they had published in Tirana the names of those who were imprisoned or upon whom sentences had been passed. However, when the Serb Communists seized power, they put their victims to death secretly without much ado, avoiding the publication of names. Only the UDB and the local organization of the Communist Party were informed on what was going on. Moreover, the local organization in question would omit to inform the Central Committee of the Party in Belgrade, considering these crimes to be of little significance.
65. There have been at times some men of courage who have gone to Belgrade to make inquiries regarding the crimes committed against the Kosovars. The Central Committee appeared surprised, and replied quite sincerely that it had not as yet been informed on the matter in question, and that it would refer to the Party Board of Kosovo for explanations. Members of this Party Board are Gjoko Pajkovic, Pavle Jovicevic, Cedo Topalovic, Ismet Shaqir, Kol Shiroka, the Nimani brothers, and Mehmet Hoxha. As board members, these men do not like to disclose that there exists dissatisfaction in the Kosovo, and besides, they do not wish to waste time in lengthy correspondence. In their reply they are likely to state that the population is eager to collaborate with the Serbians in the construction of socialism in Yugoslavia, and that it is loyal to Marshal Tito and the Party. As a result, the radio and press stress the wonderful situation created in the Kosovo and in Serbia by men of extraordinary brains and skill.

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66. The aims of present Yugoslav policies concerning the Kosovo are quite clear. Thirty-five KNOJ officers attached to units stationed in Kosovska Mitrovica, Pec, Djakovica, Prizren, Pristina, and Ferizaj, were selected to study the Albanian language in September 1951. While Albanian is being taught to the Yugoslavs, there are numerous Kosovar students who have requirements for military schools, but who are turned down. There are some, however, who are occasionally sent to schools for non-commissioned officers. The few Albanian officers who are to be found in the Yugoslav Army are former Partisans.

Present Economic Situation

67. The years following the Tito-Cominform break were extremely difficult for Yugoslav economy in general and the economy of the Kosovo in particular. These years proved to be even more difficult than that of 1947. Relief came, however, with the arrival of [] goods in the summer of 1950. 50X1-HUM Rigorous grain quotas were established by the Government until 1951. All possible coercive measures were applied against the peasants of the Kosovo in order to compel them to give to the State the prescribed quota in grains. Because cooperative farming did not provide the Government with more grain supplies than individual peasant contributions yielded in the past, the Communists did not particularly insist that they be maintained. The peasants were told by the authorities that they did not have to work exclusively in collective farms, but could return to work on their own lands which were cut to very small proportions by the Government. The peasants of the Kosovo are burdened with taxes, the restitution of surplus grains, "voluntary" and obligatory work, loans to the State, and numerous contributions to Government organizations. They have no ration cards for foodstuffs and textiles, no discount on travel tickets, and no social security. When a Communist regime has deficits, it forces loans upon the population. Government employees are obliged to surrender half of their salaries, and the peasants are obliged to turn over 2,000 dinars worth of their products. Fortunately, there was an improvement (sic) in the spring of 1951.
68. The peasants and a large majority of the townsfolk of the Kosovo are never sure that they will be able to obtain necessary articles, since many types of merchandise are not available in the stores. Many scarce articles are sold only to privileged persons. Not even Government employees can purchase some articles despite the fact that they are amply provided with ration coupons. Clothing and footwear are extremely difficult to obtain. Pristina, a town of 26,000 inhabitants, has only three textile shops which open only twice a week, on the days when merchandise arrives. These shops do, however, always have excellent articles in their window displays for propaganda purposes. Such items are reasonably priced, also for propaganda purposes.
69. After the Yugoslav Government was accorded assistance [], the 50X1-HUM economic situation within the country improved visibly. A price list established by the Government for agricultural products per kilogram, in the Kosmet area after the harvest season, demonstrated that prices in 1951 were lower than in the two preceding years. []


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70. A common laborer or simple employee with family was allotted the following daily supplies for his ration coupons: 1 kilogram of corn, 750 grams of meat, 250 grams of sugar, 250 grams of butter, 1,250 grams of potatoes, 1 kilogram of onions, 250 grams of oil, 2 kilograms of cabbage, 1 kilogram of eggs, two apples, et cetera. Such individuals could never pay for the entire ration from their meager daily salary of from 100 to 120 dinars. The prices for these foods [redacted] are exorbitant considering the fact that these foods are obtained in the form of gifts from the producers and cost the Government nothing. The Government will not allow free market prices on food products because of the huge profits it makes through fixed prices. 50X1-HUM
71. Materials and textiles are even more difficult to obtain than foodstuffs because of the extremely high prices for such items. It is a rarity to see anyone wearing a new suit, and if an individual is seen sporting such a garment, he is invariably suspected of black market activities at the expense of the population. The purchase of textiles and other merchandise is rendered difficult through lack of currency. 50X1-HUM
72. The fact that the Kosmet area is not a direct recipient of [redacted] aid is justified by the Regional Communist Committee on the grounds that the majority of the Kosovar population own fertile land; although the inhabitants are obliged to surrender a certain amount of their crop to the Government, they are presumed to retain for themselves a large percentage of their produce. The Kosovo area has nevertheless indirectly

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benefited from the [] assistance proffered in 1950, since 50X1-HUM
greater prosperity has resulted from the chain of reaction of general
economic improvement throughout Yugoslavia. Textiles and foodstuffs for
example, are again appearing on the free market. The only direct aid given
to this area was in the form of beans, condensed milk in tins, and powdered
eggs for children. However, none of these items are distributed gratis.

73. The somewhat improved economic conditions in the Kosovo area have not alleviated the problem of unemployment, which appears to be steadily increasing. A brief visit to any of the towns in the Kosmet region, such as Pec, Kosovska Mitrovica or Pristina, will be sufficient to give the on-looker an idea of the situation. Here in public squares large groups of Albanian peasants will be seen waiting from dawn to dusk for some kind of manual labor. Speaking to each one of them will reveal a story of misery. They are starving perhaps because of having lost a limb in the mines of Serbia and having, as a result, been abandoned to a tragic fate. In many cases, Serbian doctors refuse to tend to them. It is of little assistance to be supplied with documents certifying to disability incurred in an industrial accident.
74. Prospects of life for those Kosovars who work in the mines are somewhat better than average because of the higher salaries offered. Individually, however, the Albanians are not successful in gaining any advantage from this relative wealth because of their large families which are still in great part patriarchal. Their physical endurance is soon exhausted, and on the average they return to their homes in a poor state of health. If they voluntarily quit the mine, as they frequently do, they lose all rights to indemnity.
75. The living conditions of Albanian employees of the Yugoslav Government have not been of the best in the past two years. Yugoslav Government workers in the Ministries bog down the bureaucracy instead of contributing to its efficiency. Some of these men have consequently been released, while others have been successful in obtaining letters of recommendation for the "rifugium peccatorum" of the Serbs, the Kosmet, despite the fact that the administration of this region was already top-heavy. It is hardly necessary to add that Albanian Government employees have been obliged to make way for the Serbs in the Kosmet. Even hotel employees have been replaced by the Slavs.

Religion

76. In their campaign against Catholicism, which they define as black internationalism, the Yugoslav Communists did not spare even the small number of Albanian Catholics of the Kosovo region (approximately 25,000 persons). Between 1941 and 1944, persecution did not limit itself to religion, but extended to various other aspects of life. In the campaign against Albanian Catholics, the Government availed itself of Albanian Communists of the Moslem faith as well as of [] Serbians and Montenegrins. Severe measures, including arrests, were used by the Government authorities against the 50X1-HUM Catholic clergy, particularly after the assassination of the priest Father Petar Bernardin Lupi in 1946, and the trials of Don Pjeter Berisha and Don Mark Shiroka which followed. In 1950, members of the Catholic ecclesiastical administrations of Djakovo and Pec were expelled and sentenced to from two to three years of prison. They were accused of sabotage, by having attempted to join the Catholic clergy of Yugoslavia in a protest []

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77. Whereas the Orthodox churches were spared from persecution, on the one hand, numerous mosques and Catholic churches were closed to worshippers on the other. Asim Luzi, the Mufti of Djakovo was assassinated. Other religious personalities of the Moslem faith were imprisoned, and consequently forced to abandon all religious activity and assume employment as clerks in various offices. The basic accusation aimed against them was that they had stood in support of the reactionaries, from whom they were getting support in return. Notwithstanding these and similar activities, Communist laws in Yugoslavia decreed the freedom of worship.
78. Actions undertaken by the Communist Government in Yugoslavia were directed against the religious principles of the Moslems and Catholics, and aimed at undermining the religious consciousness of the faithful. [redacted] On the other hand, as early as 1945, the Yugoslav Government had promised to open up in Prizren a Serb Orthodox theological school which would be subsidized by government funds. Fanatical Serb chauvinists comprised the staff of instructors. In the spring of 1950, upon the anniversary of the foundation of the school, pictures of it were placed for sale in book stores throughout Kosmet. The caption accompanying the pictures read "Praised be God for the liberation of the Kosovo". Numerous complaints and protests from anonymous Albanians flowed into offices of the regional committee and the corresponding committee in the Serbian Government. The reply released from these offices was to the effect that "the clergy is free to pray to God, in whom it believes. We cannot interfere with their prayers".
79. During Serb Orthodox religious festivities, the Government allowed Communists to take part in religious rites. These were carried out with much pomp, and the participants included vast numbers of the Montenegrin and Serbian population. Communists seized this occasion to sport their Partisan medals and decorations acquired in 1941. They appeared on the scene well shaven and wearing new apparel, and the Orthodox priests blessed and praised these men who had taken part in the liberation of the Kosovo region. The religious procession wound its way from one Orthodox church to another, pausing at numerous points on the way for the delivery of speeches. The final point was the cemetery. Here prayers were delivered for fallen heroes. Mosques and Catholic churches, now reduced to warehouses for the storage of such things as cement, potatoes, machinery or other goods were ignored. Confronted with such a spectacle, one can well imagine the feelings within the hearts of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia.
80. In the beginning, the Orthodox faithful were closely watched during church services, or when making an offering. At present, however, no one bothers about them anymore, even if they spend all day in church. Now that the Orthodox clergy has thrown out of its churches sacred objects, it can run from church to church and fully dedicate itself to its religious cult.
81. Great religious fervor, however, is to be found among the Moslems who comprise the larger part of the population. Although many mosques have been closed, the faithful flock in large numbers to those which are open, demonstrating in this way solidarity and scorn for the Communist oppressors.
82. Numerous Albanian families living in Prizren, Pristina and Pec speak Turkish as fluently as they do Albanian. As a result there is an attempt on the part of the Serbs to maintain that those who speak the Turkish language are of Turkish ancestry, and should therefore be educated in that

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language. They take advantage of the profound religious sentiment among the population of the area to discourage the friendship which the Kosovar Moslems have with the Catholics of that area, and which they say is not tolerated by the Moslem religion. Kosovar Albanians who persist in this friendship should consequently be considered Catholics, and in that case, why do they not go to Rome?

83. The anti-religious propaganda campaign which has been developed into an art by the Government has had its effect upon the population. Any measure which will prove a vulnerable point of attack is utilized. There is no lack of promises of employment, or assistance in food or clothing, in order to induce or win over the populace. The Government has been successful in winning the cooperation of such men as Hafiz Bajram of Djakovo, Sheh Ali of Prizren, and Xhevdet Pallaska, secretary of Reiz Ulema of Sarajevo. The latter are men of no moral, religious, social, or patriotic scruples.

Cultural Situation

84. Statistics reveal that new elementary and secondary schools for instruction in the Albanian and Serbian languages in the Kosovo region were opened up as early as 1951. The purpose of these schools, however, was to deliver the coup de grace to Albanian nationalism. There were, in 1950 and 1951, as many as 27 elementary schools and 28 secondary schools or gymnasiums covering the four lower grades. From among pupils attending the gymnasiums, approximately 95 per cent were Montenegrins and Serbs, while only from 15 to 20 per cent were Kosovar Albanians. The poor economic status of the Kosovar population was largely responsible for this low attendance. There is very little assistance in clothing or money to poor students. In rural areas particularly, the situation with regard to students' uniforms is bad since the students depend largely upon contributions of local committees.
85. The Government compels even the youngest children to be educated to hate the so-called reactionaries, who include both rich and poor peasants. An antagonistic attitude is even cultivated against their parents, so that the young generation shall grow up to be staunch supporters of Communism. The names of children who have been cajoled into revealing family secrets are placed at the top of the list for annual assistance given to poor or deserving students by the school.
86. However, notwithstanding the various shortcomings of the schools, the fact that their number has increased in the Kosmet and other areas where Albanian is spoken is in itself of great significance. Also, the cultural level in secondary schools has greatly improved, particularly in the field of music and fine arts. The Music School at Prizren has made marked progress through the courage and perseverance of Professor Lorenc Antoni, of Prizren, who breasted great opposition to make possible the revival of Albanian art, its traditions and folk songs. The attendance at this co-educational school is high.

Press and Publications

87. After the Yugoslav-Cominform break, the Government found it necessary to revise its stand on various administrative and propaganda issues. Among the first steps taken was an intensification of defensive propaganda through the press and cultural clubs. From 1948 until the present time this change on issues was gradual. All publications have been placed under a system of control to insure that they comply with the new concepts of

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Tito's Yugoslavia. This entailed much loss of time in the Public Education Offices of the Serbian Government because of the slow process of translating from Albanian into Serbian. Since it was not within the jurisdiction of the offices where the translating was done to exercise censorship or control over school texts written in the Albanian language, it was necessary to wait until the other competent offices had given their approval. In the meantime, official relations between Yugoslavia and Albania grew more and more tense, and consequently politics were likewise introduced into these Albanian text books. The results included:

- a. Erratic methods applied to Albanian text books. Approval for translation would first be given, then withdrawn. Although the original in Serbian would already be in circulation, when it came to translating the text into Albanian, the author would be accused of Cominformism;
 - b. Delay in approval of funds for translation;
 - c. Delay in issuance of permits to print books in the Albanian language after they had been translated. Although a pedagogical commission was entrusted with jurisdiction over such matters, it was further necessary to obtain a permit from a higher commission in Belgrade in charge of political censorship. As a result the text would lie for months in the library of the pertinent Ministry;
 - d. Long delay in printing at the publication offices in Belgrade;
 - e. Long delay for distribution procedures to be established. Suggestions for distribution on the basis of the number of students in the secondary schools of the same localities are sent to book stores of the larger centers within these localities. Because the Serb booksellers are more interested in the sale of Serbian books, they delay their replies, often omitting the information requested; and
 - f. Lately rules regulating the sale of books in the Albanian language have been changed numerous times, and each time the cost of the book has increased. The rules issued in 1949 for Albanian books were actually applied only in 1951. These rules facilitated the publication of an Albanian anthology, the writings of Bajran Curri, a book on Albanian folklore, and a text for use in elementary schools. Most of these books were translations from the Serb language.
88. Attempts on the part of Serbs and Montenegrins to sabotage Albanian intellectual life by all means available date back to the break of diplomatic relations with Albania. In 1951, government authorities made obligatory the education of the Albanian minority at the secondary and university levels in Serbian schools. The justification for this measure was that printing offices were submerged with work and it was impossible to further burden them with books written in Albanian.

Communism Versus Albanian Nationalism

89. Current Yugoslav ambitions in the Balkans are seriously opposed to demands of Albania for recognition of the rights of the Kosovar people. In the event of a war, the Albanian nationalists would represent a serious threat to Southern Serbia. Students particularly play an important role in the nationalist movement. The greater the efforts on the part of the government to imbue them with Communism, the more their spirit of nationalism

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is reinforced and the firmer is their hope and belief in a future, which, if not fully satisfactory, will at least be better than Communism.

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90. University students of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia have been able to achieve an intellectual level equal to that of the students [redacted]

[redacted] Many out of despair have joined the resistance, operating in small groups. Such clandestine nationalist groups seriously worry government authorities, who fear that mere arrests will be insufficient to eliminate such activity. Every possible repressive measure is utilized to achieve results. Men without conscience are chosen from among fanatic Kosovar Moslems and from among Albanian Communists and placed in the employ of the Serbian Government, either in administrative posts in the Kosovo, or in offices for public education. The purpose is to weaken the nationalist sentiments of the Kosovars.

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91. The main aim of Yugoslav internal policy in Kosmet, is to transform the Moslem Kosovars [redacted]

[redacted] In order to further their own interests, a portion of the city-dwelling population adopted the Turkish language for commerce and dealings with the government. With time, however, many families came to feel that Albanian should only be used to talk to uneducated persons. A purely worldly reason led several Kosovar families to speak Turkish, in much the same manner as in certain mundane drawing rooms there is a craze to speak in French rather than the mother tongue. After thirty years of Serbian domination, however, the Turkish language spoken by this group has been corrupted by an admixture of Albanian and Slav words. Even giving instruction in the Moslem faith in Turkish has become difficult for the Kosovars. Though there are still a number of families in the cities of Prizren, Pristina, Mitrovica, and Vucitrn, who continue to speak Turkish,

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[redacted] They also could have manifested their feelings in 1945 when they fell back to Serbian domination. In fact, this was done by a minority in the city of Skoplje and in the village of Menuse in the Prizren district.

92. The 8th of March, 1951, a festivity day for the Anti-fascist Women of the Communist World, was chosen by the government authorities as the opening day for the Turkish language schools in the Kosovo. Presiding at the inauguration was Khavid Nimani, member of the Communist Central Committee, and the address was delivered by Shafir Ali, [redacted] and a member of the Communist regional committee. On the morrow of the festivities, the latter stated that he would prefer to be a gypsy rather than to again consider himself as of Albanian origin. In his speech he said that socialism had a tendency to march with gigantic and dynamic steps toward cultural heights, and that the Albanian language, by nature poor, could not maintain the rhythm required to reach these lofty summits, and that consequently, it was necessary to study the Turkish language in order to get there. The 8th of March was planned in all its details by Communist supporters such as Boro Milatovic, member of the Committee for Public Education in 1944, Mita Milkovic, formerly president of the same committee, later Serbian minister for public education, [redacted] Jagosh Gjilasi, a Montenegrin, currently an instructor, Nikola Vojdovic, and Nikola Jasicic assisted by Alush Gashi, member of the Inspectorate for Public Education, and by Stathi Kostari.

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93. Prior to 8 March 1951 when Turkish schools were established in the Kosmet upon the wishes of the Yugoslav Communist Party, a propaganda machine to campaign in support of same was put into action under the direction of Alush Gashi. Members of the Communist Party in the Kosmet are amazingly successful in interpreting even the slightest desires of the Central Committee communicated to them either by voice or letter. During a meeting of the Regional Committee on 12 March 1951, Gjoko Pajkovic, Secretary General of the Party, said that the Government was ready to give full support to all those speaking their mother tongue, the Turkish language at home, and who hoped to educate their children in this language. It is in this manner that the Yugoslav Government is firmly resolved to solve the question of anti-Slavism in the Kosmet.
94. Details of the plan to denationalize the Albanian minority were discussed at numerous secret meetings held in the Inspectorate for Education in Pristina, at Communist Party meetings, and in the home of Gjoko Pajkovic. In this regard, three meetings are known to have been held by Pajkovic, two by Dusan Mugosa, one by Petar Stambolic, president of the Republic of Serbia, one by Mosa Pijade, and one by Aleksis Aksentijevic, former finance minister in the Serbian Government. The result of all these meetings was the decision to take positive action against any Albanian "chauvinists" who dared raise their voices to question [redacted] those who 50X1-HUM pretended that their mother tongue was the Turkish language. The first two prominent men to oppose such measures were individuals whose patriotic records were by no means immaculate. Perhaps after seven years of numerous criminal deeds they rose to the defense of their people as a result of a guilty conscience! Fadil Hoxha was dismissed from his position as president of the Regional Council for having argued that such procedure was not included in the Party directives. His release was effective upon the orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and only because of his past Partisan services was he given a purely formal position of Inspector within the Communist Committee for Serbia. Khavid Nimani, the other to succumb, was released from his position in the Economic Directorate of the Region.
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95. Communist Party meetings aimed at convincing Albanians of the Moslem faith to join the [redacted] group, are held daily at Prizren. Promises, cajolery, and even menaces of arrest are resorted to, particularly when dealing with those who speak the Turkish language. Individuals who were discriminated against in 1945 such as businessmen whose property was confiscated, and other persons who were prohibited the practice of their religious functions were now being favorably approached. Among basic themes developed at such meetings in Prizren, the following ones taken from a teacher's notebook are significant:
- Everyone has the privilege of being educated in the language of his choice, or which he considers to be his mother tongue, providing of course, that this meets with the Party line;
 - Turkish language schools will be opened up everywhere on the basis of the existing laws; [redacted]

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- c. Tactics to be employed in order to achieve the desired result are that the Albanian language is not as well developed as the Turkish language, and that it is not possible to continue to maintain a slackened pace in cultural development;
- d. Be wary of Albanian chauvinism;
- e. Avoid Albanian chauvinism which cannot benefit you, and endeavor to uncover the "Ballist" followers of Enver Hoxha and Xhafer Deva; and
- f. your children should be educated in Turkish schools. The Government will assist you in this end. Albanian chauvinists to date have done nothing for you. 50X1-HUM
96. A commission made up of two UDB officers and various zone representatives, community councillors and members of the Regional Committee, is in charge of recruiting the youth for registration in Turkish schools. This is done by a door-to-door canvas. The campaign is carried out with great vigor in Pristina and Prizren, whereas the drive is somewhat more reserved in Kosovska Mitrovica, Pee, Vucitrn and Gnjilane. An arbitrary list is drawn up of the prospective pupils. Parents are advised to send their children to the Turkish school, and on the opening day attendance is called on the basis of the list drawn up by the commission. In this manner, parents find themselves in a fearful dilemma, not knowing whether to bow down to force or to follow their own conscience and desires.
97. Approximately 500 students, largely of the elementary grades, but also including numerous students of the gymnasium level, were obliged to abandon Albanian schools and enroll in Turkish schools in the 1951-52 semester. This number includes students attending schools at Manuse, Stanovci, Vucitrn and two other areas in the district of Pristina, where Turkish is largely spoken because of its Circassian population. The following is a partial list of statistics covering Albanian students forced to attend Turkish schools:

<u>Scholastic Year</u>	
<u>1950-51</u>	<u>1951-52</u>
Prizren : 97	800
Pristina : 63	350
Mitrovica : 90	200
Pee : 70	120
Gnjilane : 34	100
Vucitrn : 26	83
<u>380</u>	<u>1,653</u>

98. Albanian instructors were quite naturally opposed to the loss of their students and some were brave enough to voice their opposition. As a result approximately one tenth of the teachers and instructors in Albanian were either imprisoned or lost their position while others were expelled from Yugoslavia on 30 July 1951; the latter were instructors, who upon their dismissal were invited to take out Yugoslav citizenship but declined. The following is a list of statistics on teachers who became destitute after the closing of Albanian schools in 1951-52:

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Dismissed Instructors</u>	<u>Schools closed</u>
Pristina	30	10
Prizren	35	12
Pec	22	7
Mitrovica	30	12
Gnjilane	28	10
Kamenica	10	6
Vitine	15	8
Djakovo	10	6
Podujeve	10	4
Vucitrn	8	5
Perizaj	8	6
Total	<u>213</u>	<u>90</u>

99. The Yugoslav Government's justifications for these measures are given in the following arguments:
- Necessity to cut down on the cadre of instructors for budgetary purposes;
 - To renew the cadre with more competent men;
 - To provide for the possibility of militarizing the corps of instructors; and
 - To eliminate troublemakers.
100. Another method employed by the Yugoslav Communist Party to weaken the Albanians was to transfer capable instructors from the large cities to smaller ones. Teachers who were less qualified were appointed to their posts and the excuse proffered was that it was imperative to send the capable instructors to smaller backward areas where they would be instrumental in helping to raise the cultural level. The truth of the matter is that since Turkish schools were located in the larger cities, it was in the interest of the Government that Albanian schools should exist among inferior conditions so that the population would be attracted to Turkish schools. Serbian and Turkish schools received ample government support, while Albanian schools had great difficulty in obtaining even a small financial assistance, and even their premises and classrooms were taken away from them.

Yugoslav Policies

101. Yugoslav policies in the Kosmet region, the application of which Dusan Mugosa is largely responsible for, can be listed as follows:
- To separate Albanians of the Moslem faith from the Catholic Albanians, and thereby to do away for all time with the problem of an Albanian Moslem minority;
 - To keep the Albanian minority at a low cultural level;
 - To take advantage of hostile dissensions among the population in order to eliminate Albanian nationalism. Thus in the event of a war, large-scale nationalist movements would be prevented at the very inception without the need to resort to much bloodshed, since one must keep in mind that in the event of hostilities, Albanian nationalists would not lack the support of the Albanian Government;

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- e. To smooth the way for a census in the Kosmet in order to convince the interested Powers that the Albanians do not represent 85 per cent of the population, but rather less than 50 per cent; and

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102. Recent laws stemming from a reorganization of the public education system in Yugoslavia demand that 40 per cent of the Albanian high school graduates be barred from further pursuit of their studies. In connection with this steps were taken in 1951 to eliminate as many as 60 per cent of the students at the examinations required for higher learning. It is alleged that the doors of the law faculty are barred to Albanian students so that they may not be in a position to defend their rights.

103. In the early part of July 1951, the Committee of the Serbian Communist Party called together a group of Albanian students to explain to them the motives for the opening of Turkish schools. Upon this occasion the students were informed that 50 scholarships granted by the State had been reduced to 15. Of the officials present, Dusan Mugosa, Mehmet Hoxha, and Fadil Hoxha are listed among other Communist personalities.

Albanian Arts

104. It is customary during any Albanian artistic or cultural, and particularly dramatic presentations, to commence with a long speech in praise of Tito and the Communist Party for their deep understanding of the arts, and to express appreciation for the permission accorded Yugoslav writers to present their work to the public. All presentations given in the Albanian language are translations from the Serbo-Croat. As such they are deprived of interest, since they are already known to the theater-going public in their original version. At the end of the presentation, agitators who customarily attend all Albanian cultural showings whistle or mock the actors in order to provoke the Albanians and to uncover among the audience those who voice their protest. Albanian actors are advised by the Communist Party to be well prepared, since an unfavorable reaction on the part of the public would make it necessary to discontinue the performance. Various methods are employed to provoke and rouse Albanian artists, and thus to prevent them from further appearing in public. In the summer of 1951, six prominent actors in the Kosmet were expelled from the theater and replaced by practically unknown actors. The intention was to convince the public that the Albanians can not act.

Social Situation

105. Yugoslav Communists upon assuming power, did not desire to find themselves in open contradiction to promises made to the Albanians in 1945 by leaders of the National Liberation Movement, and kept many senior officials of the Albanian minority in the Government. The majority of these officials demonstrated great flexibility in adapting themselves to the new situation. From 1950 on, however, the trend was to turn over the better positions to Serbians and Montenegrins. The Montenegrins in particular became easily assimilated with the population of the Kosmet. Gjoko Pajkovic from Berana became chief of the Regional Council, while numerous subsidiary councils were headed by other Montenegrins.

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106. The application of Communist theories within the social field entails in itself a subdivision of the population into classes. This new Communist society can be divided into the following groups or classes:
- a. Privileged Party class which is in power;
 - b. White collar workers, factory workers and workers of government cooperatives, who are entitled to ration coupons and pensions; and
 - c. Wide masses of the proletariat living in cities and villages, and reactionaries who are obliged to work without the compensation of rights or privileges.
107. To the above subdivision, another or fourth class can be added in the Kosovo region, that of the Albanian minority. Albanians in Yugoslavia are not treated in the same way as are the Montenegrins and Serbians. Proof of this is in the excessive application of the laws when dealing with the Albanians as opposed to the Montenegrins and Serbians; also in the higher quotas which they must meet in grain contributions to the State, in higher taxes, and in higher payments for other obligations demanded by the Government. Albanians are obliged to take in Serbian employees coming to the Kosmet, as roomers. There have been cases when entire families were assigned to a single room to make way for the newcomer, who need only pay an illusory monthly rental of 150 dinars per room. This sum will not even cover the electricity consumed by the tenant. On the other hand, homes of Montenegrins and Serbians are not registered with the housing office. This is alleged to be done as a compensation for their suffering during the past war. In recent times, Serbians have been known to rent their rooms for a monthly profit of from 600 to 1,500 dinars.
108. A group of fifty sanitation officers came to the Kosmet in the summer of 1950 equipped with medical supplies of all kinds. Instead of alleviating human suffering, they gave lectures on socialism, and took films in the very poor homes of the gypsies. These films were later shown to the Yugoslav public under the title of "Life in the Metohij". Not a single two-story building was shown, nor for that matter, any of the picturesque castles of the region. The purpose of this type of propaganda was to convince the Communist public of the incapacity of the Albanian people to rise to a higher social plane, and of the prodigious efforts undertaken by the regime to improve the life of these semi-primitive people.

Albanian Resistance

109. In order to withstand the numerous injustices of the Yugoslav Government toward the Albanian minority, Albanian nationalists decided that if they could unite the dissatisfied population of the cities and villages in the Kosmet into groups, they could channel common efforts toward a common good, and give rise to a movement which would have a national rather than a local character. After several meetings between a small number of individuals in the homes of Mehmet Ali and Ymer Doda, Albanian nationalists in Pristina, the following decisions were reached on 15 February 1951.
- a. Creation of an Albanian nationalist organization with headquarters in Pristina. The organization would be given a simple title in order to avoid any suspicion on the part of Yugoslav authorities on the one hand, and internal discord on the other;
 - b. The aims of the new organization would be directed toward the ultimate unification of the Metohija region and other Albanian territories with Albania. The organization will cooperate with all parties, but not the Communist Party;

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- c. The following are various methods and procedures to be implimented within the organization:
- 1) To group together nationalists and dissatisfied Albanians who are Yugoslav citizens, so that in the event of troubles in Yugoslavia or a third world war, they would be prepared to revolt, even if no outside assistance should be forthcoming;
 - 2) Extending of moral and material assistance to families of Albanian patriots who have either been imprisoned or have escaped abroad;
 - 3) Closer relations with nationalists in Albania;
 - 4) To establish contact with Albanian political refugees in exile;
 - 5) To counteract through the use of propaganda Yugoslav Government measures aimed at breaking up the unity of the Albanian population, or any similar measures undertaken by the Communist Party or by royalist Serbians or Montenegrins;
 - 6) To undertake protective measures against Government intrigues directed toward the Albanians, and to uncover covert Serbian and Montenegrin organizations; and
 - 7) To attempt to establish nationalist organizations in all cities. These organizations will be under the jurisdiction of the central organization in Pristina.

- d. In connection with the new organization, an executive council will be established, made up of cells A and B. Cell A is to be made up of a group of restricted members who will meet every time it is necessary, and no member will be allowed to be absent from the meeting unless for a very serious reason. Cell B will be made up of a larger group of members who will have the right to act upon their own individual initiative, but only and always under the direct jurisdiction of Cell A.

110. The following results have been achieved to date on the establishment of an Albanian nationalist organization:

- a. In Djakovo, Prizren, Pec, Plava, Mitrovica, Vucitrn, Podujevac, Vitine, Gnjilane, Uskup, Tetovo, and Presevo, basic groundwork has been laid by the establishment of branch organizations under the jurisdiction of and with the same structural set up as the headquarters organization. Cell A in the provincial councils is composed of three persons, but only a single individual establishes contact with the Pristina headquarters. Further efforts are [] to establish branches in Rahovec, Dragasi, Suharek, and in various areas of Macedonia, Kumanovo and Montenegro;
- b. Followers are being recruited from among political prisoners in Pristina, and internees in labor camps;
- c. Operational activities are being carried out by members of the Bloku Kombetar Independent, Gjon Gjinaj and Kol Cuni; and
- d. Operational planning is in part being completed by Zef Nikaj, member of the council of Cell A, and Gjon Gjinaj and his companions. Nevertheless, great caution in being employed in the implementation of propaganda measures against Government attempts to break up the unity of the Albanian population, and in protective measures against Government intrigue.

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111. In order to carry into effect the various methods and procedures [redacted] for a secret Albanian nationalist organization [redacted], Cell A of the headquarters organization is hoping to reach an agreement with emigre Gjon Gjinaj on the following questions: 50X1-HUM
- a. To establish relations and reach an agreement with nationalists in Albania to cooperate for the successful creation of a free Albania. Such cooperation will depend upon political events;
 - b. To obtain from some prominent Albanian political emigre an accurate account of the political situation in the Kosovo, and to exhort the population to be patient and to wait until the right time has come;
 - c. In the event that the Kosovars (sic) should find themselves exposed to danger, they should be able to find shelter [redacted] or elsewhere, with the assistance of Albanian nationalists; and 50X1-HUM
 - d. Radio transmitting stations which are anti-Communist in character, should be supplied with material which will inform the rest of the world of the actual situation of Albanians in Yugoslavia, and assure the Kosovars that they can count upon assistance [redacted] in the event of an emergency. 50X1-HUM
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114. The majority of Kosovars living in Yugoslavia share the opinion that with the loss of the Kosovo and other territories to Yugoslavia, Albania has been deprived of much of its dynamism, and will require the assistance and protection of [redacted] This would mean a decided lessening of Albanian sovereignty. A smaller faction of Albanians believe that once Albania has been freed of Communism, she will be able to win back the Kosovo. This faction favors the coordination of efforts with Albanian nationalists before the possible outbreak of a third world war, and the need [redacted] to reach an advanced understanding with Yugoslavia on the destinies of the Kosovo and of Albania proper.
115. The nationalist intransigent faction, as a specific group comprises approximately 65 per cent of the Kosovar population. This faction desires to reunite with Albania. It is estimated that at an initial outbreak of hostilities the faction would rise at once to 85 or 90 per cent.
116. The Communist or philo-Communist faction among the Kosovars which desires union with Enver Hoxha's Albania, is not much greater than five per cent. Those who desire the return of the Karadjordjevic dynasty in Yugoslavia, and the return of Zog in Albania, vary between 10 and 15 per cent.
117. The following are various factors which contributed toward increasing the original suspicions of the Kosovars toward emigres entering Yugoslavia since the bitter dissappointments caused by Yugoslav political successes with Esad Pascia Toptani, Ahmet Zogu, and lately with Enver Hoxha:
- a. The person to whom the Yugoslav Government gave the assignment of directing Albanian emigre affairs is Dusan Mugosa, a Montenegrin, [redacted]
 - b. In March 1951 Yugoslav authorities did not place Albanian refugees at the head of the Prizren Committee but rather well known men who had served in the UDB, and who had no scruples or sentiments of [redacted]

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c.

118. Because the Kosovars themselves experienced the terrors of Communism in 1944, they sympathise deeply with the emigres, the majority of whom are either friends of theirs or belong to Albania's foremost families. They feel instinctively that it is part of their duty to help these refugees who have abandoned their country and loved ones, not out of gain, but out of the will to survive. It is the hope and belief of the Kosovars that Communism will be overcome in the near future through the work of Albanian emigres abroad.
119. Yugoslav Albanians are not completely confident that their own emigre leaders will place national questions above individual differences or party differences, or even above their personal interests. The Kosovars know that they do not have in their own country the necessary cadre of political men, and for this reason they turn to their leaders who are living abroad. What they demand of these leaders can be listed as follows:

- a. That political parties in exile refrain at least temporarily from matters of dissention, or at least until such time as the death blow has been dealt to Communism;
- b. That one among them be appointed by all parties and political factions to speak and work in the name of the Kosovar people, and that he be supplied by them with the necessary material, in order to bring light upon the facts and rights of Albania in having her own borders restored;
- c. That they should not lose faith with the Albanian heroes who although representing various parties, had fallen for a single ideal;
- d. The Kosovars cannot lift their voices directly in protest to Yugoslav policies, and it is up to radio transmissions from abroad to inform the rest of the world, that the leaders in exile agree with the demands of the Kosovars for national vindication;
- e. To send to the Kosovo a number of covert groups just prior to the outbreak of war, or in the event of serious movements in Yugoslavia; and
- f. To publish an irredentist paper which will inform the rest of the world of the policies of denationalization conducted by Yugoslavia toward the Kosovars.

120. The Kosovars are convinced that Albanian political parties abroad will not be able to obtain satisfaction for their nationalist demands if divided and incapable of eliminating their diverse antagonisms. It is for this reason that they request that a "committee of national unification" be established, which will bring together the efforts of the leaders, and still maintain the individuality of the various parties. The Kosovars also ask that their leaders reach an agreement with the more prominent emigre leaders of other countries, such as Croats, Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, who have escaped from Yugoslavia, on the following points:

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- a. To publish facts and statistics on the atrocities committed by Serbians and Montenegrins during World War II;
- b. To inform the rest of the world that Yugoslavia is the vanguard and instrument of Slav supremacy in the Balkans (sic);
- c. To expose for their denationalization activities in Kamuria(sic) and for their plans for conquest in Southern Albania; 50X1-HUM
- d. To publish statistics on the Albanian population who are Yugoslav citizens in order to prove that Kosovar claims are justified;
- e. To prove that it is ridiculous that Albania, the smallest nation in the Balkans, should have aggressive aims towards her neighbors;
- f. To present the case favoring an Albania which will be an equal partner in a Balkan confederation, and that will safeguard these rights; 50X1-HUM
- g. To ascertain that there will be an exchange of Slav minorities in the event that the Kosovo should be reunited with Albania;
- h. To emphasize the fact that Albanian Communists had received more material aid in the last war than was the case with the nationalist parties;
- i. To stress that the Albanians are a religious people with patriarchal sentiments, and are tied to traditions which are in absolute contradiction to Communism; and
- j. To seek the collaboration of a government which does not have territorial interest in Albania.

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